Recently, the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment duration has become widespread. The reduced form approach in empirical studies (see e.g. Lancaster (1979) and Kooreman d~Ridder (1983) ), in which only hazards of the duration distribution are estimated, seems to be replaced gradually by a more structural approach. The latter way of modeling is characterized by the explicit use of a reservation wage equation in empirical analysis. Lancaster 8~Chesher (1983) and Narendranathan 8~Nickell (1985) use the complete theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search behaviour.
However, the structural models used in these two studies are stationary. This implies that variables like the unemployment benefit or the rate of arrival of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment which is often at variance with reality. What's more, various reduced form empirical studies indicate a significant duration dependence of the reemployment probability (see e.g. Blau~. Robins (1986) , Kooreman 8R idder (i983), Lancaster (1979) and Narendranathan, Nickell 8~Stern (1985) ). Consequently, there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time based on a nonstationary theoretical framework.
In the last fifteen years, a few papers have been published that pay some attention to nonstationarity in job search theory (see e.g.
Burdett (~979), Gronau (1971 ), Heckman 8~Singer (1982 ), Lippman 8~McCall (1976b and Mortensen (1984) ). Although these articles draw important qualitative conclusions concerning the movement of the reservation wage over time, generally no attention is paid to a rigorous derivation of formulas for the time dependence of the reservation wage. Furthermore, only very specific departures from stationarity are examined, like finite lifetimes or shifting wage offer distributions. Most models are specified in discrete time.
In this paper we examine the consequences of nonstationarity in continuous-time job search models in a rather general setting. Section 2 gives a brief overview of job search theory. Various causes of nonstatioriarity Ltiat may arise are discussed, like macro-economic events and changes in the personal situation of individuals during the spell of unemployment.
In section 3 and 4 we present the main theorems concerning the movement of the reservation wage over time in nonstationary models. The exogenous variables like unemployment benefits and wage offer distributions are allowed to vary over time in a very general way. The more specific the assumptions about the time paths of the exogenous variables, the more detailed our inferences about the time path of the reservation wage are.
In section 3, we also give some comparative dynamics results. These results concern the shift in the optimal reservation wage path if we replace some particular time path of an exogenous variable by another. We also examine the unemployment duration density in case of nonstationarity.
In section 5 we illustrate by means of numerical examples the importance of allowing for nonstationarity. Section 6 concludes. It is outlined how the results of this paper can be used for estimation purposes and for policy analysis.
Job search theory and the introduction of nonstationarity
Job search theory tries to describe the behaviour of unemployed individuals in a dynamic and uncertain world. Job offers arrive at random intervals folowing a(semi-)Poisson process with arrival rate a. Such job offers are random drawings (without recall) from a wage offer distribution with distribution function F(w). Once a job is accepted, it will be kept forever at the same wage. It is assumed that individuals know~and F(w).
During the spell of unemployment, e benefit b is being received. One can think of b as unemployment benefits minus the costs of searching for a job. Unemployed individuals aim at maximization of their own expected present value of income (over an infinite horizon). The job search model described here contains three exogenous variables (~, b and F(w)) and one constant parameter p, which is the subjective rate of discount (p~0). We now discuss the concepts of stationarity and nonstationarity in this model. Let time T~denote the point of time at 3 which an individual becomes unemployed. We call the job search model that describes the search behaviour of this individual stationary, if the exogenous variables,~, b and F(w) are constant on the time interval [TC,m) .
In combination with the infinite horizon assumption, this means that in case of stationarity, the unemployed individual's perception of the future is independent of time or unemployment duration. Consequently, the optimal strategy is constant during the spell of unemployment.
Let us assume that F(w) is continuous in w, that this distribution has a finite first moment and that 0 C a~o and~b~( m. For a stationary job search model satisfying these conditions, it has been shown many times that the optimal strategy can be characterized by a reservation wage pro- -G(u;t) in which G(u;t) represents the distribution function of u. By integration,
S(u;t) -a(t;u). exp{-Gfu~(ttw)dw} u~0.
In order to obtain properly defined present values and in order to restrict attention to economically meaningful cases, we impose the following weak conditions concerning the exogenous variables in our model. 
tlt~`tTt~4
. There exists some number T such that all exogenous vartables are constant on [T,m).
0~p~m
We allow for negative b, in order to capture the case in which search costs exceed unemployment benefits. Further, from assumptions 2 and 4, we infer that g(u;t) as defined in equation (3) is a properly defined density for every t) 0.
Note that a model which satisfies assumptions 1-5 allows for quite general patterns of movement of the exogenous variables over time, comprising virtually every nonstationary situation that may arise in practice.
3.2. The optimal path of the reservation wage Let R(t) denote the expected discounted lifetime income at t, if from t onwards the optimal search strategy is followed. It can be proven that under assumptions 1-5, R(t) is a bounded continuous function of t. We now present a characterization of the time path of the optimal strategy. The proof is Qiven in the appendix. It also contains a discussion of the uniqueness of the reservation wage.
The differentisl equation (4) So~(t) be the optimal reservation wage at time t if the environment remains stationary after t, i.e., from equation (1),
We want to compare y~(t) and g~~(t). Further, from equation (4), for every~(t), (6) c~~pR(t)
J~(t) -P t a(t).F(9~(t);t) -P t 8(t) ) 0
in wtiich 9(t) denotes the rate of escape from unemployment at time t(see subsection 3.4). Consequently, if 9~(t)~9~G(t) then pR(t)~0. Let RG(t) and R(t) denote the value of search at t for the cases in which the optimal reservation wages are given by 9~G(t) and~(t), respectively.
It is clear that PG(t) -p.RG(t) and 9~(t) -p.R(t) ( see appendix 1). UsinS these
eqations we can show that the relationship between 9~and~G that we found above is perfectly plausible.
If for example 9~(t) ) g~G(t) then R(t) ) R~(t) which means that there are future changes in the values of the exogenous variables that altogether benefit the value of search R(t)
as compared to the "stationary state" value of search RG(t). As time proceeds, these future changes come nearer. Both because future income is discounted by a positive rate p and because the probability of not findint a job before the changes take place (following the optimal strategy) increases as time proceeds, this implies that R will rise at t(compare equation (6)). So the right-hand derivative of R with respect to time at t is positive and consequently pR(t) ) 0. Note that the argunent applies to every two possible reservation wages at t, in the sense that it makes clear that given the values of the exogenous variables at t,~1(t) ) 9~2(t) implies 9~iR(t) )~2R(t). This is exactly what equation (6) says. In section 4, where we make an additional assumption concerning the exogenous variables, we return to the interrelations between~, p'and 9~G.
Theorem 1 can be used in order to determine 9~as a function of time. First solve for~at the point T after which all exogenous variables are constant (thís is easily done using equation (1)).~(t) is a continuous function of t. Therefore 9~(T) serves as an initial condition for the differential equation (4) 
Comparative dynamics
In this subsection we examine the consequences for the optimal reservation wage path when replacing some particular time path of an exogenous variable by a different (higher) path. For sake of convenience we will be using the term "reference model" in case every exogenous variable follows the reference path, while the term "alternative model" denotes cases in which one exogenous variable dces not follow its reference path while the others do.
Variables in the reference model will be labelled with a subscript r. Consider two arbitrary points in time tl and t2, such that 0 5 tl C t2 5 m . We consider four different departures from the reference model:
C3) vt E[tl, t2~F(w;t) first order stochastically dominates
Fr(w;t), that is, vw E(ar(t),~(t)), F(w;t)~Fr(w;t).
C4) b't E[tl,t2) F(w;t) i s a mean preserving spread of Fr(w;t), that is, E(w;t) -Er(w;t) and dx E~a(t),~(t)) a(t)fx F(w;t)dw~a(t)fx Fr(w;t)dw
It is important to remark that in every case Ci, for every exogenous vari- 
The proof is given in appendix 3. By reversint the reference model and the alternative model, we obtain the results in case of "downward" shifting exogenous variables. Simultaneous occurrance of some C1, C2, C3, C4 can be examined by sequential application of theoreu 2. In theorem 2, the inequality restrictions concerning p~r(t) are imposed only for expositional elegance; they rule out uninteresting cases in which changing exogenous variables do not influence the reservation waóe path. Sufficient conditions in terms of the exogenous variables are given in appendix 3.
Note that if we take for every t~0 that a(t) -0,~(t) -~(which holds for example in case of lognormally districtured wages) and b(t)~0, then the restrictions are always satisfied.
The intuition behind (i) and (ii) is straightforward. Any future shift in the time path of exogenous variables that benefits the expected discounted lifetime income, induces job searchers to be aore selective in their search process. As for the period up to tl, the shift in exogenous variables after point tl becomes more i mportant when going forward in time. This implies that~(t) will shift away from~r(t) when t comes closer to tl. However, it is not always true that dt E(tl,t2)~'(t) (~r(t), if properly defined. It i s easy to find time paths of the exogenous variables in the alternative model that cause~'(t) )~r(t) for some t E~tl,tZ~. The unemployment duration density is given by the well known equa- If it exísts, the expected unemployment duration can be written as
Mortensen
From (7) we infer that if for some t a(t)~~(t)~S(t), then shifts in net benefits that cause a rise of~(t) will also cause a fall of 8(t).
Because of the continuity of p(t) and F(w;t) as functions of t and w res- In appendix 3 sufficient conditions for a(t3)~~(t3) C S(t3) are given.
Exogenous variables as step functions of time
In the sequel we adopt an additional assumption, namely:
6. F(w;t),~(t) and b(t) are step functtons of t on [0,~~. 3) F1 first order stochastically dominates while~(T) C S1 D4) F1 is a mean preserving spread of F2 while al C~(T)C~1.
Then we have two intervals, [O,T) and [T,m) with each its own stationary
solution which will be denoted by~1 and~2, respectively. Whether~1~~2
can be examined by calculating the well;known derivative of~1 with respect to the exogenous variable that changes at T. If the derivative is negative, then~2 C~1 and consequently~(T) C~1, as~(t) -~2 for t~T.
We can then apply theorem 3 in order to obtain the following
Corollary
Let assumpttons 1-6 be satisfied. Let T be the only one potnt tn time at mhich exogenous variables are allo~ed to change values, accordtng to D1, D2, D3 or D4. Then~1~~2 and
(i) for every t E [O,T )~2 C~(t) C~1,~'(t) ( 0,~" (t)~0 (ii)~(T) -~Z.~L(T)~0,~R(T) -0.
Note that a part of this corollary can also be proven using theorem 2. Burdett (1979) and Mortensen (19~7) proved that in case D1, for every
t E[O,T~~'(t) C 0, in e model in which time devoted to search is endogenous. Mortensen (1984) also proved that for every t E[O,T'
(t) C 0 if, in terms of our model, both~and b decrease at T.
Numerical examples
In order to illustrate the results so far, we give some numerical examples. We consider two different models. In both models waQe offers are assumed to be distributed uniformly between 1500 and 3000 units of money figure 2 . Note that the decrease in A at t-24 causes the duration density of the job searcher who uses the optimal strategy, to be discontinuous at t-24. This is also shown in figure 4 , which gives the hazard rate of the searcher who uses the optimal strategy. As time proceeds,~(t) decreases and Using these special examples as a guideline, we can try to derivcs omewhat infor-mally some general properties of 9~(t) and h(t), in a model in wliich exogenous variables only change value at t-24. First, if b is the only variable that changes value at t-24, then the duration density will look more like an exponential density than if~or F(w) change value at t-24. This is because changing~or F(w) results in a discontinuous density. It is clear that assuming stationarity in the model while it is not present in reality gives rise to errors when estimating the model. We saw that sometimes a nonstationary model has a density h(t) that does not differ much from an exponential density, e.g. if b decreases at T while a and F(w) are constant and anticipation is strong. Even in such cases substantial errors can be made if one assumes stationarity and uses duration data to estimate structural coefficients.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined nonstationarity in job search theory. The optimal reservation wage path over time has been derived under some weak assumptions concerning the exogenous variables. We also have given comparative dynamics results. Furthermore, by assuming the exogenous variables to be step functions of time we were able to derive additional properties of the reservation wage path. Generally these properties are in accordance with economic intuition. In section 5 we considered somewhat informally the restrictiveness of the stationarity assumption.
The results of this paper can be used for estimating stuctural nonstationarity job search models, in order to make inferences about search behaviour. For such purposes, data on durations and post-unemployment wages, and (interview) data on reservation wages can be used. As for the exogenous variables, b can be taken to represent observed official benefits. It is well known that in the estimation of structural job search models, one easily runs into identification problems (see Flinn á. Heckman (1982) and Ridder 8~Gorter (1986)). Generally it is necessary to have a parametrized F(w) and to have a or the parameters of F(w) be dependent on some observables.
Once a nonstationary structural job search model is estimated, it can be used for policy analysis. By means of simulations, the consequences of alternative unemployment benefit policies on search behaviour can be examined.
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P(t) -OfOg(u;t)[P.Ofub(tts)e-Psds t e-pu{4~(ttu) t Q(~(t4u); tfu)}]du
Using ( 3), this can be transformed into If we differentiate ( A6) with respect to t we obtain
(A7) P'(t) -P.P(t) -Pb(t) -a(t).Q(~(t);t)
As can be seen from (A6), differentiation is only allowed in points at which~(t), b(t) and F(w;t) are continuous in t. However, because these variables are always right-continuous in t, the right-hand side of (A~)
gives the right-hand derivative of~o(t) with respect to t at points at which exogenous variables are discontinuous. Similarly, because the lefthand limits of these variables exist, the left-hand derivative of p(t) with respect to t at such discontinuity points is defined by (A8)~i(t) -P.
v~(t) -P.TTt b(T) -~Tt a(T).~Tt Q(~(t);~)
This completes the proof of theorem 1.
It can be proven that the results i n theorem 1 remain valid if we replace~(t)~0 in assumption 2 by~(t) 2 0, that i s, if we allow for situations that people remain unemployed forever in the sense that Of~g(u;t)du~1.
Zf p(t) (as defined by (A5)) does not lie within the upper and lower bound of the interval on which the waee offer density is positive, then there are generally many other reservation wages that describe the optimal policy at t. Still, the reservation wage as defined by (A5) can be used any time to describe optimal behaviour of job searchers during their spell of unemployment.
Strictly decreasing exogenous variables
We consider models in which one exogenous variables is time dependent in a way that is described by one of the following four cases, while the others are constant on the interval [O,m)
first order stochastically dominates F(w;t}T), that i s, vw E~a(t}T), p(t) ) F(w;t) ) F(w;ttT)
is a mean preserving spread of F(w;ttt'), that is, E(w;t) -E(w;ttT) and vx E Ca(t), p(t)) a(t)fxF(w;t)dw ) a(t)fxF(w;tt~t)dw
Note that in all cases we allow the exogenous variable to be discontinuous in a finite number of points. In order to rule out uninteresting situations in which decreasing exogenous variables do not make the reservation wage time dependent, we impose some restrictions on~(t). In cases K2 and K,~we impose for every t E[O,T) that 9~(t) ( p(t), while in case K4 for every t E[O,T) a(t)~9~(t)~p(t) has to hold. Let fL(s) denote the left-hand limit of f(x) at x-s, if it exists. The restrictions can be characterized by the following restrictions on the exogenous variables.
K2 ) b C~B

K3) b C pL(T) K4) aL(T).(ltp) -P. E(w;T) ( b~pL(T).
Theorem A1
Let assumptions 1-5 be sattsfied. Let in addttton one exogenous vart- 
Proof of theorem A1
1'he structure of the proof is as follows. First we restrict attention to an unspecified time interval within which the exogenous variables are continuous. In lemma A1 we show that sufficient for (i) and (ii) to hold in the interval is that, loosely speaking, g~C(t) is strictly decreasing within that interval. The remainder of the proof is concerned with finding conditions that impose the required property to 9~C(t) for every interval, using backward induction. Consider case K2. For every t) T~(t) -9~0(t) holds, due to the stationarity after T. If A is discontinuous at T, then~L(T) ) a(T). Because b~p holds, we have for every t) 0 that~0(t) C s holds (see equation (5)). Consequently, Q(~0(t)~0 and therefore aL(T) ) a(T) implies OL(T) ) p0(T), as can be seen from equation (5).
,,t ) with t-T. Take a t E[t,,,t~and a T~0. Then, because b and
Again, Q(9~0(t))~0. Further, a(tt2)~~(t). Inspection of (A10)
shows that therefore 9~0(ttT) ) 4~0(t) cannot hold. Because this is true for -every t E[t~,t ) and for every T~0, we infer that ( A9) holds for the interval ending at T. Lippman~. McCall (1976b) consider a generalization of case K3, for which they derive a result similar to theorem A1 in a discrete-time model with the property that in every period exactly one job offer arrives.
Proof of theorem 2
We split the time axis into a finite number of intervals, within which all exogenous variables from both models are continuous functions of time.
The intervals are closed to the left and open to the right. We let tl and t3 be left-hand bounds of an interval and we let t2 be the right- (Ali)~'Ít) -4~r(t) -P(~(t) -9~r(t)) -~Ít){Q(PÍt);t) -e(r~r(t);t)} If t-u, we replace~'(t) -~r(t) by~R(u) -~rR(u). As for every t E[u,t2)~r(t)~~(t) holds, we have Q(~r(t);t) ) 0 on [u,t2) . So if there is a t E(u,t2) at which y(t)~~r(t) then it follows from (All) that~'(t)~~r(t). Also, if~(u) ( pr(u) then~R ( We just derived that~(u) ) r(u). Going through the same line of argument, if follows that for every t E[y,u)~(t) )~r(t). Whether t3 -u or t3 C y does not matter for this result. We can proceed this way until we arrive at the interval of which tl is the right-hand bound, say [v,tl) . We now have for every t E(v,tl) 
(A13)~'(t) -~r(t) -P(~(t) -~r(t)) -~(t) {Q(~(t):t) -Q(~r(t):t)}
